Chapter 12 - Applications to cease refugee protection

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  1. 12.1. Introduction
  2. 12.2. Legislative framework
    1. 12.2.1. Reforms to cessation regime - 2012
    2. 12.2.2. Overview of cessation provisions in IRPA
  3. 12.3. Jurisdiction to decide applications to cease - Refugee status conferred by s. 95(1)
  4. 12.4. Procedure
    1. 12.4.1. Responsible minister
    2. 12.4.2. How an application is made
    3. 12.4.3. Order of questioning
    4. 12.4.4. Language of proceedings
  5. 12.5 Interpretation of the grounds
    1. 12.5.1. Burden and standard of proof
    2. 12.5.2. General principles
    3. 12.5.3. Paragraph 108(1)(a) - Reavailment
      1. 12.5.3.1. Voluntariness
      2. 12.5.3.2. Intention
        1. 12.5.3.2.1. Minors
        2. 12.5.3.2.2. Presumption from obtaining a passport
        3. 12.5.3.2.3. Application of the presumption in the case law
      3. 12.5.3.3. Actual reavailment
    4. 12.5.4. Paragraph 108(1)(b) - Voluntary acquisition of nationality
    5. 12.5.5. Paragraph 108(1)(c) - Acquisition of a new nationality
    6. 12.5.6. Paragraph 108(1)(d) - Re-establishment
    7. 12.5.7. Paragraph 108(1)(e) - Change of circumstances
  6. 12.6. Other issues
    1. 12.6.1. Discretion to consider which grounds apply
    2. 12.6.2. Relevance of future risk
    3. 12.6.3. Relevance of humanitarian and compassionate considerations
    4. 12.6.4. Abuse of process and similar arguments
    5. 12.6.5. Constitutionality of cessation provisions

12. Applications to cease refugee protection

12.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the issues that arise in Minister’s applications to cease refugee protection (referred to in this chapter as “applications to cease” or “cessation applications”). The “cessation” provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act(IRPA)Note 1 apply in situations when a person who was conferred Canadian refugee status no longer needs that protection or where that protection is no longer justified.Note 2 There are serious consequences to the protected person when the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) grants an application to cease..

While all the grounds for cessation apply to both the adjudication of refugee claims and Minister’s applications to cease refugee protection, this chapter focuses on Minister’s applications, which are made when the Minister wishes to have refugee status that was previously granted revoked.

12.2 Legislative framework

12.2.1. Reforms to cessation regime - 2012

The law related to cessation was significantly amended on December 15, 2012. On that date, the IRPA was amended by the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act.Note 3The amendments added sections 40.1 and 46(1)(c.1) to the IRPA. While the amendments did not change the substantive elements of cessation in section 108, the consequences became more severe.

Prior to the amendments, a protected person did not lose permanent resident status if he or she had been granted that status. The amendments changed this for four of the five grounds of cessation, meaning that with the exception of the one ground over which the protected person has no control, namely the reason for seeking protection no longer exists, a permanent resident now loses his or her permanent resident status and becomes inadmissible upon a successful application to cease refugee status by the Minister.

The impact on the number of Minister’s applications to cease made to the RPD was immediate. The result is that almost the entire body of Canadian jurisprudence on applications to cease refugee status has been developed since 2012.

12.2.2. Overview of cessation provisions in IRPA

Subsection 108(1) of the IRPA sets out five grounds for cessation of refugee protection, while subsection (4) sets out an exception to the application of paragraph 108(1)(e) – commonly referred to as change of circumstances:

Rejection

108 (1) A claim for refugee protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, in any of the following circumstances:

(a) the person has voluntarily reavailed themself of the protection of their country of nationality;

(b) the person has voluntarily reacquired their nationality;

c) the person has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of that new nationality;

d) the person has voluntarily become re-established in the country that the person left or remained outside of and in respect of which the person claimed refugee protection in Canada; or

e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist.

Exception (4) Paragraph (1)(e) does not apply to a person who establishes that there are compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country which they left, or outside of which they remained, due to such previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment.

Subsection 108(2) of the IRPA allows the Minister to make an application to the RPD to declare that refugee protection has ceased for any of the grounds set out in subsection 108(1):

Cessation of refugee protection

(2) On application by the Minister, the Refugee Protection Division may determine that refugee protection referred to in subsection 95(1) has ceased for any of the reasons described in subsection (1).

On a successful application to cease refugee protection, subsections 40.1(1), 46(1)(c.1), and 108(3) of the IRPA have the combined effect of (i) rendering the protected person inadmissible to Canada;Note 4; (ii) removing permanent resident status, if they had it; and (iii) deeming the claim of the protected person rejected. In other words, the person becomes an inadmissible foreign national.

There is an exception to becoming inadmissible and losing permanent resident status where the protected person had become a permanent resident and the only ground of cessation is paragraph 108(1)(e) - the reasons the person sought protection have ceased to exist, colloquially referred to as a change of circumstances:

Cessation of refugee protection — foreign national

40.1 (1) A foreign national is inadmissible on a final determination under subsection 108(2) that their refugee protection has ceased.

Cessation of refugee protection - permanent resident

(2) A permanent resident is inadmissible on a final determination that their refugee protection has ceased for any of the reasons described in paragraphs 108(1)(a) to (d).

Permanent resident

46 (1) A person loses permanent resident status … (c.1) on a final determination under subsection 108(2) that their refugee protection has ceased for any of the reasons described in paragraphs 108(1)(a) to (d);

Effect of decision

108(3) If the application is allowed, the claim of the person is deemed to be rejected.

In Ravandi,Note 5 the Court found that paragraph 46(1)(c.1) is not to be read in a way which means that a person loses permanent resident status “on a final determination under subsection 108(2) that their refugee protection has ceased for any of the reasons described in paragraphs 108(1)(a) to (d) unless it is also found to have ceased for the reason described in paragraph 108(1)(e).” The Court also stated the same applies to subsection 40.1(2). In other words, the protected person loses that status and becomes inadmissible when an application to cease is allowed under paragraphs (a) to (d) regardless if the application is also allowed under paragraph (e).

Finally, paragraph 110(2)(e) of the IRPA provides that neither the Minister nor the protected person who is the subject of a cessation application has the right to appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division from a decision of the RPD to allow or reject an application. Rather, the way to contest such a decision is by making an application for leave and judicial review before the Federal Court:

Restriction on appeals

110(2) No appeal may be made in respect of any of the following: … (e) a decision of the Refugee Protection Division allowing or rejecting an application by the Minister for a determination that refugee protection has ceased;

12.3. Jurisdiction to decide applications to cease - Refugee status conferred by s. 95(1)

Subsection 108(2) of the IRPA provides that the Minister may make an application to the RPD to determine that refugee protection “referred to in subsection 95(1)” has ceased. Subsection 95(1)Note 6 provides that refugee protection may be conferred by the RPD, by the Minister in an application for protection (pre-removal risk assessment or PRRA), or where a person has been determined to be a Convention refugee or “a person in similar circumstances” under a visa application.

Therefore, the RPD has jurisdiction to decide applications to cease refugee protection not only with respect to refugee protection conferred by the RPD following an in-Canada refugee claim, but also protection conferred by the Minister in the context of a PRRA application or by a visa officer overseas.

What is included in the phrase “a person in similar circumstances” in paragraph 95(1)(a) has been the subject of litigation before the Courts. In this respect, the Courts have examined the question of whether the RPD has jurisdiction to hear applications to cease refugee status with respect to persons selected overseas in the various refugee classes set out in Part 8 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (regulations).Note 7 In particular, the Courts have discussed the jurisdiction of the RPD to hear cessation applications in the context of persons overseas selected to become permanent residences in the “Convention Refugees Abroad Class”,Note 8 the “Humanitarian-Protected Persons Abroad Class”,Note 9 and the “Protected Temporary Residents Class”.Note 10

In Siddiqui,Note 11 the Federal Court of Appeal dealt with the question of whether a person who was granted permanent resident status in the “Country of Asylum Class” (now referred to as the “Humanitarian-Protected Persons Abroad Class”) was subject to the cessation provisions of section 108 of the IRPA. The Court held that the cessation provisions applied in these circumstances and that the RPD did have jurisdiction:

[17] In sum, a reading of IRPA leads to the unequivocal conclusion that the cessation provisions of section 108 apply to both Convention refugees and country of asylum or re-settlement class. Section 95 provides protection to both Convention refugees and members of the county of asylum class. What ceases under section 108 is the protection that is conferred under section 95 and Parliament expressly crafted section 108 so as to apply the cessation provisions to “protected persons,” regardless of the means by which protection is granted.

Therefore, the Court answered the following certified question in the affirmative:

[… D]o the same or substantially the same legal considerations, precedents and analysis apply to persons found to be Convention refugees as to persons found to be in need of protection as members of the Country of asylum class?

A different conclusion has been reached with respect to accompanying family members of those selected in the Convention Refugees Abroad Class. In two cases, the Court found that the RPD did not have jurisdiction to hear a cessation application regarding persons who became permanent residents in the Convention Refugee Abroad Class as accompanying family members.

In Esfand,Note 12 the respondent (protected person) entered Canada on a permanent resident visa in the Convention Refugee Abroad Class as an accompanying family member of her husband. The Court noted that under the regulations, family members are considered members of the same class as the foreign national determined to be a Convention refugee, without their risk being independently assessed. Therefore, the respondent had never been “determined” to be a Convention refugee and it made “no sense” for the respondent to face negative consequences for visiting Iran, a country for which she never claimed to be at risk.

On similar facts, the Court came to the same conclusion in GezikNote 13. In both cases, the Court certified a question of general importance on this issue, but an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was not pursued in either case.

In Camayo,Note 14 the protected person argued that the principles from Esfand and Gezik should apply to a person who was granted refugee protection by the CRDD in 2010 when she was a minor and unaware of why her family came to Canada to claim refugee status. The Court rejected this argument, finding that, although the scheme of the IRPA and IRPR could be clearer insofar as inland claims involving family members are concerned, the protected person fell within the ambit of paragraph 95(1)(b), and consequently the RPD has jurisdiction to cease her protected person status. The Court drew a distinction between inland claims and the Refugee Class Abroad because an individual risk assessment is performed for each claimant for inland claims. The Court certified a question of general importance which is, at the time of drafting this paper, pending before the Federal Court of Appeal.Note 15

12.4. Procedure

12.4.1. Responsible minister

Subsection 4(1) of the IRPA provides that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC)Note 16 is responsible for the administration of the Act except as otherwise provided in the section. Since section 4 does not indicate another Minister is responsible for applications under section 108, and the Governor in Council has not made an order pursuant to subsection 4(3) which would designate another Minister for the purpose of subsection 108(2), the responsible Minister making applications to cease refugee protection is the Minister of CIC.Note 17

12.4.2. How an application is made

The process for making an application is set out in the Refugee Protection Division Rules (RPD Rules).Note 18

RPD Rule 64 provides that an application to cease refugee protection must be in writing and include the following information:

  • The contact information of the protected person and their counsel, if any;
  • The identification number given by the department;
  • The date and file number of any decision with respect to the protected person;
  • In the case of a person whose application for protection was allowed abroad, the person’s file number, a copy of the decision and the location of the office;
  • The decision that the Minister wants the Division to make; and
  • The reason why the Division should make that decision.

Rule 64(3) requires the Minister to provide a copy of the application to the protected person and the original to the Division, together with a written statement indicating how and when a copy was provided to the protected person. Where the protected person is no longer in Canada, the Minister may be permitted to serve the protected person at an address outside Canada and the person may participate by telephone or other appropriate means.Note 19

In some circumstances, the Minister may not be able to locate the protected person to serve a copy of the application. In those circumstances, the Minister is required to make an application under RPD Rule 40 to vary or be excused from the service requirement. That rule also provides that the RPD must not allow such an application unless it is satisfied that reasonable efforts have been made to provide the document as required. In determining applications under rule 40, the RPD has considered such factors as the Minister’s efforts to search internet databases, searches in the Canadian Police Information Centre database, personal attendance at the last known address, attempts to reach the protected person at the last known telephone number, and the relative quality of the Minister’s evidence on the merits of the application to cease.Note 20

Once a protected person has been served with an application, pursuant to RPD Rule 12, the onus is on that person to notify the Division and Minister of any address changes for themselves or their counsel. This obligation was considered in Perez.Note 21 The RPD proceeded in absentia when the protected person did not appear for his hearing. He claimed that he had moved and did not receive the Notice to Appear. The Court held that there was no obligation on the RPD to conduct an extensive investigation to locate the protected person. However, the Court quashed the decision because the protected person claimed that he left a voicemail for the RPD with his new address and telephone number, and IRCC used this updated telephone number to contact him in 2019 after the application was allowed. There was no evidence as to how IRCC would have had this updated telephone number if it hadn’t been provided by the protected person. Therefore, in the particular circumstances of the case, and giving the benefit of the doubt to the protected person, it appears the telephone number was recorded in some form, and in a manner that could have been accessed by the RPD, such that the protected person could have been contacted. In the circumstances, it was procedurally unfair to proceed in absentia.

12.4.3. Order of questioning

At the hearing of a cessation application, RPD Rule 10(4) provides that the Minister’s counsel will begin questioning any witness, including the protected person, followed by the presiding member and then the protected person’s counsel. RPD Rule 10(5) provides that the order of questioning may be varied in exceptional circumstances, including to accommodate a vulnerable person.

12.4.4. Language of Proceedings

RPD Rule 18 provides that the Minister must make an application to cease in the same language as was used in the original refugee claim proceedings. The protected person may then change this language upon notice in writing no later than 10 days before the day fixed for the next proceeding.

12.5. Interpretation of the grounds

12.5.1. Burden and standard of proof

The burden of proof in an application to cease refugee status rests with the Minister on a balance of probabilities.Note 22 The Court has also held that there is no right to counsel when a claimant is convoked to an interview prior to cessation proceedings being commenced. It is, therefore, an error to exclude evidence based on a breach of the right to counsel in such circumstances.Note 23

12.5.2. General principles

Paragraphs 111-116 of the UNHCR HandbookNote 24 provide some general guidance on the interpretation of the cessation clauses which have been cited in Canadian jurisprudence.

In particular, paragraph 111 explains the rationale for the cessation provisions, being that refugee protection is no longer necessary or justified. However, paragraph 112 cautions against an overly broad application of the cessation clauses because refugees need assurance that their status will not be subject to constant review.

Paragraphs 113-115 set out the cessation clauses with reference to Article 1 C of the 1951 Convention.

Paragraph 116 of the Handbook states that the cessation provisions are exhaustive and “should be interpreted restrictively.”

The Federal Court in BashirNote 25 cited these interpretative principles with approval and applied the “strict” approach in rejecting the Minister’s more expansive interpretation of the presumption that applies from obtaining a passport from the country of persecution.Note 26 Likewise, in Gezik,Note 27 the Court stated that it was applying the “restrictive and well-balanced approach” that should be adopted in interpreting the cessation provisions.

12.5.3. Paragraph 108(1)(a) - ReavailmentNote 28

Paragraph 108(1)(a) of the IRPA provides, in effect, that a protected person’s refugee protection ceases if he or she “has voluntarily reavailed themselves of the protection of their country of nationality.” This ground of cessation is the one most often invoked in applications to cease; therefore, most of the Canadian jurisprudence on cessation relates to this provision.

In Kuoch,Note 29 the Court stated that although the UNHCR handbook is not formally binding, it provides authoritative guidance as to the meaning of “reavailment.” In general, Canadian jurisprudence has adopted the analytical framework for reavailment that is set out in paragraph 119 of the UNHCR Handbook:

119. This cessation clause implies three requirements:

  1. voluntariness: the refugee must act voluntarily;
  2. intention: the refugee must intend by his action to re-avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;
  3. re-availment: the refugee must actually obtain such protection.

In Bashir,Note 30 the Court held that the three elements are cumulative, such that once the RPD found in that case that the protected person had no intention to reavail himself of the protection of his country of nationality, it was not an error to decline to examine the third element – actual reavailment – before dismissing the Minister’s application. However, in order for an application under paragraph 108(1)(a) to be granted, the Minister must satisfy their burden of establishing all three elements of reavailment.

In addition, the Court has held that reavailment is not limited to a single event - the analysis must take into account all of the facts and evidence before it, including the timeline of the events which, taken together, result in a finding of reavailment.Note 31

Following is a discussion of the three elements. While each have been described under a separate heading for the purposes of this chapter, the analysis in the jurisprudence does not always make a clear distinction. In particular, the issues of whether or not a person had the intention to reavail and actually reavailed sometimes appear as one analysis.

12.5.3.1. Voluntariness

Paragraph 120 of the UNHCR Handbook provides examples of where a refugee may not be considered to be acting voluntarily, such as where the claimant obtains a passport at the request of the country of refuge or where it is necessary to pursue certain legal recourses, such as a divorce.

In El Kaissi,Note 32 the Court suggested that reavailment should not be considered voluntary when the claimant is compelled to return to the country for “reasons seemingly beyond their control”, however, returning on a holiday or to investigate a business opportunity would appear to be voluntary.

In Bashir,Note 33 the Court held that with respect to the criteria of voluntariness and intention, the same factual matrix can have a different impact depending on the criterion being assessed. In other words, “the fact the respondent voluntarily requested renewals of his Pakistani passport does not necessarily entail that, by doing so, he had the intention of reavailing himself of the protection of Pakistan.” In that case, the RPD found the protected person credible when he stated he believed a passport was required for his permanent resident application, even if that belief was mistaken. Therefore, the conclusion by the RPD that his act was voluntary was reasonable. However, the Court also upheld the RPD conclusion that the protected person did not have the intention of reavailing, and stated that “it is difficult to see how the renewal of a national passport for the purpose of submitting it to CIC to finalize the permanent residency process can be seen as indicating an intention on the part of the respondent to reavail himself of the protection of his country of nationality.”Note 34

In Mayell,Note 35 although the Court quashed the decision for other reasons, it found the RPD’s conclusion that the protected person had voluntarily obtained a passport to be reasonable. He had testified that his acquisition of an Afghani passport was beyond his control because he wanted to use his Permanent Resident Card to travel to Afghanistan to get married, but could not use his card for that purpose. The RPD conclusion that there were alternatives available, such as getting married in a third-party location or a marriage by proxy, was reasonable, absent evidence to the contrary.

In Abechkhrishvili,Note 36 the protected person argued that, because of her mental state, she was not acting rationally and thus did not voluntarily intend to re-avail herself of the protection of Georgia. The Court agreed with the RPD that the protected person’s behaviour was neither irrational nor illogical, and her diagnosed anxiety disorder was not sufficient to demonstrate she acted involuntarily. Her well thought out plans and extended stay in Georgia on two occasions suggested that her trips were intentional and planned.

In Starovic,Note 37 the protected person returned to her country of nationality, Serbia, because her husband had a heart attack, where she stayed several years. The Court stated that although her original return when her husband had a heart attack could not be considered voluntary, her lengthy stay in Serbia after that may be seen as voluntary.

In Camayo,Note 38 the Court found that it was reasonable for the RPD to conclude that the claimant did not obtain her passports voluntarily when she was a minor, but that her subsequent use of the passports to travel after she became 18 was. She made trips to care for her ailing father, although he had permanent resident status in Canada. Further, while her visits to carry out humanitarian work were honourable, they were undertaken on her own goodwill and volition. However, the Court quashed the RPD decision for other reasons.

12.5.3.2. Intention

In many cessation applications, the issue centres on whether or not the protected person had the intention to reavail him or herself of the protection of their country of nationality. Often this relates to whether or not the protected person has rebutted the presumption of reavailment that arises when they obtain a passport from their country of nationality. As of the date of writing this paper, there are outstanding certified questions before the Federal Court of Appeal on this issue. This is described in more detail below.

12.5.3.2.1. Minors

In Cadena,Note 39 the Court raised the issue of whether a young child could form the requisite intention to reavail within the meaning of paragraph 108(1)(a). However, on the facts of the case, the Court found that there was no evidence that the minor, who was eleven years old at the date of the cessation proceedings, had an intention that differed from that of his mother.

In Andrade, the Court held that the RPD should have considered whether it was necessary for the minor protected person, who was 17 years of age at the time of the cessation hearing, to testify since he “certainly had the ability to form and express an opinion about his intention to reavail…”Note 40

In Camayo,Note 41 the Court found that it was reasonable for the RPD to conclude that the protected person did not acquire her passport voluntarily when she was a minor.

12.5.3.2.2. Presumption from obtaining a passport

When looking at whether or not the protected person had the intention to reavail, Canadian jurisprudence has applied the presumption found in paragraph 121 of the UNHCR Handbook:

If a refugee applies for and obtains a national passport or its renewal, it will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed that he intends to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality.

The Federal Court in Li,Note 42 described the presumption as a “factual presumption” which operates such that the Minister is entitled to rely on the presumption by proving that the refugee obtained or renewed a passport from his or her country of origin. Once proved, the refugee has the burden of showing that he or she did not actually seek reavailment.

In Cadena,Note 43 a case where the protected persons returned to Mexico and applied for passports from within that country, the Court held the presumption did not apply as it only applied when the application is made from outside the country of nationality. However, the Court in that case upheld the RPD’s finding that the protected persons’ refugee protection had ceased.

12.5.3.2.3. Application of the presumption in the case law

Whether or not a protected person has rebutted the presumption of intention to reavail that arises when he or she obtains a passport from their country of nationality depends on the circumstances of each case. The reasons why the person obtained a passport and whether and how they used it are relevant factors.

Below are examples of how the issue of the presumption has been analyzed in the jurisprudence.

1) Examples where the presumption was not rebutted

In Maqbool,Note 44 the Court held that the protected person necessarily intended to reavail himself of Pakistan’s protection by obtaining a passport issued by Pakistani authorities since a Canadian travel document would not have allowed him to return to his country of nationality. It noted that other international travel documents were available to him, such as a Refugee Travel Document, which would have allowed him to leave Canada for all destinations, except Pakistan.

In Maqbool, the Court also rejected the argument that paragraph 108(1)(a) does not apply to persons who have achieved a durable form of protection, such as Canadian permanent resident status.Note 45

In Abadi, the Court made the point that where the person has travelled back to their country of nationality, the presumption is “particularly strong” and that “it is only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ that a refugee’s travel to his country of nationality on a passport issued by that country will not result in the termination of refugee status (Refugee Handbook at para 124).”Note 46 In that case, the claimant, a citizen of Iran, had arrived in Canada in 1996 at the age of 12 and was granted refugee status in 1999. He travelled back to Iran on an Iranian passport on two occasions to attend a wedding and visit his aging father for a total period of approximately three months. The Court held that it was reasonable for the RPD to have found he had reavailed himself of the diplomatic protection of Iran by acquiring an Iranian passport and using it to travel to Iran on two occasions, via other countries.

In Abadi,Note 47 the Court also rejected the argument that since the protected person was a permanent resident, he believed that he benefited from the security of being a permanent resident of Canada. The Court stated that the protected person’s permanent resident status may be relevant under paragraph 108(1)(d) (re-establishment), but does not detract from the fact he reavailed by travelling to his country of nationality.

In Li,Note 48 the RPD had allowed an application to cease the refugee protection of a Chinese citizen who had been granted refugee status in 1990. Since that time, he had travelled back to China on 13 occasions for lengthy periods of time for various reasons, including marriage and business. The Court found the RPD’s decision reasonable, including its reasoning that Mr. Li’s failure to apply for Canadian citizenship indicated his intention to avail himself of China’s protection instead of Canada’s. His explanation for not applying for citizenship, that he was too busy, was reasonably dismissed by the Board.

In Norouzi,Note 49 the protected person was a citizen of Iran. He arrived in Canada in 2001 and was granted refugee status shortly thereafter. Between 2003 and 2007, he returned to Iran seven times for a total of approximately 18 months. The RPD accepted that his mother was ill, but held that his mother’s health did not justify the number or length of trips to Iran, in particular where there were other family members present to care for his mother. Therefore, the presumption was not rebutted. The Court upheld the decision and stated that the RPD appropriately undertook a contextual analysis.

In Tung,Note 50 the protected person had become a permanent resident in 2004 and applied for a Chinese passport one month later. She used it to travel to China on 12 occasions for at least one month on each visit. She stated that her visits were to care for her ailing mother and to support her incarcerated husband. The Federal Court found the RPD’s decision that she had not rebutted the presumption to be reasonable. There was no evidence it was necessary for her to be in China as there were other family members there to care for her sick mother and support her husband and they had, in fact, done that during her absences.

In a similar case, Jing,Note 51 the Court held that it was reasonable for the RPD to find that the protected person had not rebutted the presumption that she intended to reavail himself of China’s protection. He claimed that he returned to care for his ailing parents, but the Court noted there were other siblings present in China to care for them. The Court also considered the length of two out of the three trips to China (two months each) and the fact the protected person had travelled to other countries on vacation using his Chinese passport.

In Sabuncu,Note 52 the protected persons had travelled back to Turkey on several occasions to receive fertility treatments. They had received such treatments in Canada but stated they could no longer afford them. The RPD allowed the application to cease, finding that while their desire to start a family was reasonable and they were entitled to pursue fertility treatments outside Canada, unlike the circumstances of a refugee returning to the country of nationality to visit a dying parent, the availability of fertility treatments was not exclusive to Turkey. The RPD found that “cost and language do not justify the risk of reavailment.” The Court found the RPD decision was reasonable.

In Abechkhrishvili,Note 53 the Federal Court distinguished Bashir because the protected person used her passport to return to her country. The protected person argued that since the RPD had accepted that she obtained a Georgian passport on the mistaken belief that she needed it for her permanent resident status, it was not reasonable to find she had the requisite intent to reavail herself of the protection of Georgian authorities. The Court stated that “The problem with this logic is that the Applicant has failed to distinguish between the act of obtaining her passport and the act of utilizing her passport to travel back to Georgia. Although her original intention may have been to obtain her passport for her PR application, the evidence is that she used the passport to travel to Georgia on two occasions.”Note 54

In Okojie,Note 55 the protected person argued that the RPD did not consider the fact that her agent of persecution was a non-state actor which was a relevant factor to consider when examining her intention. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the reasons demonstrated that the RPD was aware that the agent of persecution was a non-state actor. The protected person, by her actions, was acknowledging her confidence in the Nigerian government to protect her. That is, that adequate state protection now existed to protect her from harm at the hands of the non-state agent of persecution. She had demonstrated that she was no longer unable or unwilling to avail herself of the protection of the country of her nationality.

In Chokheli,Note 56 the Court found that it was reasonable for the RPD to conclude that the protected person had not rebutted the presumption because he was not compelled by exceptional circumstances to return to Georgia. He stated that he had returned three times to care for his ailing father. The RPD found that he was not compelled to return because his sister was in Georgia and was able to assist his father, and the protected person could have provided financial support. The most important factor indicating that he was not required to return, however, was the fact that the protected person had testified that he would not have returned to Georgia if his agent of persecution had not been jailed.

In Al-Habib,Note 57 the protected person claimed that he returned to Chad to care for his ailing mother and to help her seek medical treatment in Egypt. The Court found that it was reasonable for the RPD to conclude that the protected person’s main motivation for entering Chad was not to care for his mother, for the following reasons: other family members could take care of her; he did not keep a low profile during his stay; he did not mention to the Canada Border Services Agency that he went to Chad to help his mother, but rather said that he went there to visit his wife and son; and his mother’s Egyptian visa indicated that she did not go until May 2015, without any explanation as to why the protected person went to Chad six months earlier in December 2014.

2) Examples where the presumption was rebutted or the RPD decision was returned for redetermination

In Camayo,Note 58 the protected person acquired Colombian passports when she was a minor but used them to travel to Colombia after becoming an adult. The RPD allowed the Minister’s application to cease, finding that all of the elements of section 108(1)(a) were satisfied. The Court canvassed the case law with respect to intention and noted that there are “seeming inconsistencies on the face of several decisions of this Court in the area of cessation”.Note 59 In this case, there is no evidence as to what, if any, intention the protected person formed as an adult; nor was there evidence that the applicant was aware of the change in law that affected her permanent resident status. Therefore, the RPD erred by finding that the act of using the passport was, in itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the protected person had the requisite intention. The Court quashed the decision, certified three questions of general importance,Note 60 and stated:

[51] Ms. Galindo Camayo was a minor when her mother first renewed her passport; it was subsequently renewed involuntarily when she turned 18 because renewal was required by the Colombian authorities in order for her to leave the country. There is no evidence as to what if any intention Ms. Galindo Camayo formed as an adult when she repeated travel patterns commenced as a minor. Nor is there evidence that she was aware of the change in law resulting in her travel patterns jeopardizing her status as a protected person in Canada, a factor which could speak to her subjective and objective fear and must be assessed in this context. I therefore agree the RPD concluded unreasonably that “ignorance of the law is not a valid argument” in respect of whether a subject of cessation proceedings could form the requisite intention without knowledge of the consequences.

[52] As discussed above, intention in the cessation context cannot be based solely on intending to complete the underlying act itself; one also has to understand the consequences of ones’ actions: Cerna, above at paras 19-20. I also find no justification for the RPD’s finding, in Ms. Galindo Camayo’s circumstances, that an educated, sophisticated adult could have sought information regarding requirements to maintain her status in Canada. It was not until the Minister’s ACRP that Ms. Galindo Camayo became aware of the serious consequences of her actions, post implementation of PCISA, sought legal advice, obtained an RTD and discontinued travel to Colombia, all of which speaks to her intention regarding reavailment. I note as well her credibility was not in issue.

[53] I further note the RPD commented that Ms. Galindo Camayo “knew enough [about her potential exposure to harm or threats] to get private security to accompany her upon her return to Colombia, which indicates that she recognized the dangers associated with travelling to Colombia.” I agree, however, that the RPD failed to consider whether this was indicative she believed the state still could not protect her – a question directly relevant to her intention to avail: Peiqrishvili, above at paras 17-24; Yuan, above at para 35. It was open to the RPD to reject these measures as insufficient. Not considering them in their proper context, however, and instead focusing on whether she should have known of the danger rather than whether she knew of the possibility and consequences of reavailment and did so anyway, misses the point [of her evidence which, when viewed on the whole, was to show that she did not intend to reavail], and in my view, is unreasonable: Din, above at para 39.

In Cerna,Note 61 the protected person was granted refugee status in 2009 based on his fear of persecution in Peru due to his sexual orientation. He renewed his Peruvian passport twice and travelled to Peru several times, ranging from two to seven weeks. The RPD granted the Minister’s application. The Federal Court quashed the decision, finding that the RPD had failed to take into account the fact that Mr. Cerna believed he enjoyed the security of having permanent resident status in Canada. The RPD should have considered whether the evidence relating to his subjective understanding of the benefits of his permanent resident status rebutted the presumption that he intended to obtain Peru’s protection. However, this decision should be read in light of the decisions in Maqbool and Abadi described in the previous section, where the Court rejected similar arguments based on the protected person’s permanent resident status.

In Mayell,Note 62 the protected person was an Afghani citizen who was granted refugee status in 2003. He was issued an Afghani passport in 2012 and used it to travel to Afghanistan four times between 2012 and 2015. His trips were to get married, visit his wife, and attend the funeral of his father-in-law. He testified that he was told by legal counsel that it would be “okay” to obtain a passport and travel back to Afghanistan. The Court held that it was clear from the record that had he received proper advice, he would not have obtained a passport and travelled to Afghanistan. The RPD should have considered whether the evidence relating to his subjective understanding of his ability to obtain and use a passport to travel to Afghanistan without jeopardizing his status in Canada rebutted the presumption that he intended to obtain Afghanistan’s protection.

In Bashir,Note 63 the RPD rejected the Minister’s application to cease. The protected person had renewed his Pakistani passport three times in the hope that he would be able to visit his parents in Dubai and because a friend had told him CIC would require it for his permanent residence application. The RPD held that since the protected person did not intend to use the passport to travel to Pakistan, he did not have the intention of availing himself of that country’s protection. The Federal Court upheld the decision, as “it is difficult to see how the renewal of a national passport for the purpose of submitting it to CIC to finalize the permanent residence process can be seen as indicating an intention on the part of the respondent to reavail himself of the protection of his country of nationality.” The Court rejected the Minister’s argument that the fact the person wished to travel to a third country using his passport irrefutably leads to the conclusion he intended to reavail himself of the protection of that country. Each case must be decided on its facts.

In Din,Note 64 the Court found that the RPD did not adequately consider the claimant’s explanation regarding his intention when he returned to Pakistan. Although he returned to tend to matters concerning his retirement and to deal with problems with tenants at a property, he testified that, among other things, when he visited he was always in hiding, did not openly practice his Ahmadi faith, lived in constant fear, and did not tell anyone that he was coming to Pakistan. The Court held that in light of this testimony, the RPD’s reasoning that “refugee protection does not have a provision that allows one to return to a country…from where one seeks protection simply for financial reasons, property disputes or other reasons” missed the point of the protected person’s evidence that, when taken as a whole, he did not intend to reavail of the protection of Pakistan.

In Peiqrishvili,Note 65 the protected person had been granted refugee protection in 2005 due to a risk of persecution from her ex-husband in Georgia. She applied for and received a Georgian passport in 2009, which she used to travel to Georgia on three occasions. She testified before the RPD that she took precautions when she was in Georgia to prevent her ex-husband from being aware that she had returned. The Court quashed the RPD’s decision because the RPD did not assess how this evidence impacted the protected person’s intention to reavail. The Court recognized that other decisions, such as Yuan, analyzed such evidence under the third branch of the test; “however, it may be that evidence of a refugee’s efforts to avoid their agent of persecution is best analysed in considering the refugee’s intention (i.e. the second requirement of the s 108(1)(a) test), as there is jurisprudence suggesting that actual reavailment (the third requirement of the test) focuses upon whether a passport has actually been issued by the country of nationality.” In addition, this evidence needed to be considered even if there were no exceptional or compelling circumstances underlying the protected person’s procurement of her passport or travels.

In Antoine,Note 66 the RPD had rejected the Minister’s application to cease, finding that the protected person had rebutted the presumption that he intended to reavail himself of the protection of Haiti when he returned there three or four times. The Minister sought judicial review. The Court dismissed the judicial review, concluding that it was reasonable to find that the protected person’s trips were due to an exceptional circumstance and that there was no intention on his part to reavail himself of Haiti’s protection. The RPD noted that the protected person took precautions when he was in his country of nationality and that he had testified that while in Haiti, he travelled with a police friend in an armoured car, and only when necessary. He did not move about while he was in the country, limiting himself to visiting and taking care of his father, and staying in his family home. These considerations are relevant to the determination that the RPD must make.

12.5.3.3. Actual reavailment

Paragraph 121 of the UNHCR Handbook makes a distinction between actual reavailment and occasional or incidental contacts with national authorities. For example, it provides the example of obtaining a passport, which raises a presumption that the protected person intends to reavail, as opposed to obtaining other documents such as birth or marriage certificates, which would not normally be considered to constitute reavailment.

In addition, paragraph 125 of the UNHCR Handbook makes a distinction between travel with a passport issued by the refugee’s country of nationality, and travel with another document -- the latter not necessarily resulting in actual reavailment of protection. Canadian jurisprudence has also emphasized in some cases that travel with a passport from the person’s country of nationality implies that the person has availed himself or herself of the “diplomatic protection” of that country.Note 67

The Courts have examined several factors to determine if a protected person actually reavailed himself or herself of the protection of their country of nationality. As described below, use of a passport to travel, the reason for the travel, whether or not the protected person took precautions, and the length of the visit are all factors that the RPD and the Courts have considered to answer the question of whether the protected person has actually reavailed.

In Yuan,Note 68 the protected person had been granted refugee status in 2009 based on a fear of the Public Security Bureau in China due to his involvement in an underground Christian church. He obtained a Chinese passport and used it to return to China for a month in 2013 to arrange his mother’s funeral. The RPD allowed the application to cease, finding that while he did not stay in his own home or venture out in public much, he stayed in the same urban area of which he was a native and made his presence known to relatives. The Court found the RPD’s conclusion that he had actually reavailed himself of China’s protection was contradicted by these factual findings. Given that the claimant was essentially in hiding, it was not justified to find that he had actually reavailed of the protection of China.

In Jing,Note 69 the protected person argued that his case was similar to Yuan because he was in hiding when he visited China. The Court found it was reasonable for the RPD to reject this argument because it would be unlikely he would be able to remain hidden in light of the fact he travelled by train in China and stayed at his cousin’s house.

In Lu,Note 70 the protected person argued that the fact she was required to renounce her practice of Falun Gong before being issued a Chinese passport was analogous to the circumstances in Yuan, where the protected person was in hiding. The Court rejected this argument, finding that in Yuan, the protected person had actively avoided detection when returning to China whereas, in Lu, the protected person testified that she took no precautions while travelling to China.

In Maqbool,Note 71 the Court found that the protected person had reavailed himself of the protection of Pakistan by obtaining that country’s passport and travelling there. The Court also noted that there did not appear to be any extenuating circumstances nor did the protected person take any special precautions. He stayed at his family home where he and his family had been persecuted, visited friends, and went to medical appointments.

In Nilam,Note 72 lthe RPD dismissed the Minister’s application to cease, finding that the protected person had attempted to mitigate his risk of persecution during his time in Sri Lanka. In particular, the RPD held that he had confined himself mostly to his family’s home, avoided contact with neighbours and government officials, and used smaller health clinics instead of hospitals. The Court quashed this decision, finding that the RPD had come to these conclusions without regard to the evidence. In particular, the protected person’s allegation that he avoided government officials was contradicted by the fact he used a Sri Lankan passport to enter Sri Lanka on two occasions, which required him to submit to security. In addition, he used the passport to travel to India to get a hair transplant, “something that could hardly have been considered to have been compelling under any definition of the term.”Note 73 His trips were neither brief nor clandestine. He ate in restaurants, shopped, and attended wedding events which were attended by hundreds of people. The Court held that all of this raised concerns as to whether the applicant had an ongoing fear persecution in Sri Lanka and suggested he was entrusting the defence of his interests to the state of Sri Lanka.

In contrast, in Din,Note 74 the Court found that the RPD conflated “intention” with “actual protection” such that there was no indication that the RPD considered whether the protected person actually reavailed himself of the protection of Pakistan. The protected person was an Ahmadi and the country condition evidence that was before the RPD confirmed there was no state protection available to Ahmadi Muslims anywhere in Pakistan. This was reinforced by the IRB’s designation of a RAD decision as a jurisprudential guide which explained why there was an absence of state protection for Ahmadis in Pakistan. The Court held that even if the protected person intended to reavail and so had no subjective fear, there was still a possibility that he was at risk under section 97 which does not require subjective fear. The RPD simply did not address these issues.

12.5.4. Paragraph 108(1)(b) - Voluntary acquisition of nationality

Paragraph 108(1)(b) provides, in effect, that a person’s refugee protection ceases if they re-acquire their citizenship.

Paragraph 126 of the UNHCR Handbook indicates that this clause applies when a refugee, having lost the nationality of the country in respect of which he was recognized as having a well-founded fear of persecution, voluntarily re-acquires such nationality.

This ground has not been substantially considered in Canadian jurisprudence. Generally, a protected person in Canada would retain their original citizenship after becoming a protected person, at least until they are granted Canadian citizenship. For this reason, it would be very unlikely for this ground to be raised in an application to cease. A similar point is made in footnote 17 of paragraph 127 of the UNHCR Handbook about the non-applicability of this clause in most refugee cases.

In Starovic,Note 75 the protected person had claimed refugee status as a citizen of Yugoslavia of Croatian ethnicity. She later returned to Serbia. The RPD found that she had not reacquired her nationality as she had never lost it in the first place because Serbia is a successor state to Yugoslavia. This aspect of the decision was noted, but not otherwise commented upon, by the Federal Court as the decision was upheld on other grounds.

12.5.5. Paragraph 108(1)(c) - Acquisition of a new nationality

Paragraph 108(1)(c) provides, in effect, that a person’s refugee protection ceases if they acquire a new nationality and enjoy the protection of that nationality.

Only one Canadian court decision has considered this provision. In Khalifa,Note 76 the RPD had granted the claimant, a citizen of Egypt, refugee status in 2004. He was granted United States citizenship in 2012. The Minister filed an application to cease refugee protection, arguing that both paragraphs 108(1)(a) and (c) applied. The RPD allowed the application under paragraph 108(1)(c).

The protected person raised several arguments on judicial review regarding abuse of process and the RPD’s jurisdiction, which are discussed more fully below; however, with respect to the RPD’s conclusion on paragraph 108(1)(c), the Court stated:

[49] It is also reasonable that Parliament would terminate the privileged status of an applicant who no longer needs the protection of Canada because he has obtained citizenship in another safe country prior to becoming a citizen of Canada. Mr. Khalifa is now, by choice, a U.S. citizen who enjoys the protection of another country, and thus no longer needs protection from Canada. It is not the intention of refugee protection legislation under the IRPA that Canada become a country of convenience for those who wish to acquire protection in any number of countries. This determination is entirely independent of a determination that the reasons for refugee protection no longer exist in his country of origin.

In Starovic,Note 77 the protected person had claimed refugee status as a citizen of Yugoslavia of Croatian ethnicity. She later returned to Serbia on a Serbian passport. The Board found that she had not acquired a new nationality because Serbia is a successor state to Yugoslavia. This aspect of the decision was noted, but not otherwise commented upon, by the Federal Court as the decision was upheld on other grounds.

In Zaric,Note 78 the Federal Court, in the context of an application to vacate under section 109 of the IRPA, briefly discussed the effect of the acquisition of Canadian citizenship on cessation. It stated that while Mr. Zaric automatically ceased to be a refugee for the purposes of the Convention​ the moment he acquired Canadian citizenship, this did not have the effect of revoking his protected person status under IRPA. That could only be accomplished by an application under subsection 108(2).

12.5.6. Paragraph 108(1)(d) - Re-establishmentNote 79

Paragraph 108(1)(d) provides, in effect, that a person’s refugee status ceases if they voluntarily become re-established in the country in respect of which the person claimed refugee protection in Canada.

There is limited Canadian jurisprudence on the re-establishment provision in paragraph 108(1)(d). Two cases have touched on this ground of cessation.

In Starovic,Note 80 the Court upheld the RPD’s decision in which it found that the protected person’s refugee status had ceased under both paragraphs 108(1)(a) and (d). She had returned to Serbia, her country of nationality, when her husband had a heart attack. She stayed for several years before attempting to return to Canada. She was denied a visa, so her cessation hearing was heard by telephone.Note 81 The RPD found that her testimony by telephone was generally credible and that she was unable to return to Canada because she was denied a visa. However, it was unreasonable that she and her husband had not made any efforts to resettle in another country, as would be expected if they genuinely feared persecution. The Court upheld the decision, finding that although her initial return to Serbia could be seen as involuntary, it became voluntary over her lengthy stay. It was reasonable to conclude that a genuine refugee would have sought to resettle in another country rather than remaining in Serbia while the issue of her return to Canada was sorted out.

In Cadena,Note 82 the RPD found the protected person’s refugee protection had ceased under both paragraphs 108(1)(a) and (d). She had returned to Mexico shortly after having been granted status and stayed four years. Her explanation was that she was trying to bring her husband to Canada. While most of the Federal Court decision focuses on the analysis under paragraph (a), it did make the point that no presumption of reavailment or re-establishment arises from the acquisition of a passport when the person is already in their country of nationality. Because of the weight the RPD put on this passport acquisition, the Court stated that it should have elaborated its reasoning under paragraph 108(1)(d). However, the Court still upheld the decision under paragraph (a).

12.5.7. Paragraph 108(1)(e) - Change of circumstances

Paragraph 108(1)(e) provides, in effect, that a person’s refugee protection ceases if the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist. This is also colloquially referred to as a change of circumstances. While the other grounds of cessation relate to actions the protected person has taken, this ground relates to circumstances over which the protected person generally has no control.

Please refer to the discussion of this topic in chapter 7 regarding the interpretation of this section. However, the interplay of paragraph (e) with the other paragraphs of subsection 108(1) are discussed in the next section.

12.6. Other issues

12.6.1. Discretion to consider which grounds apply

An issue which has been discussed in the jurisprudence is whether, and to what degree, the RPD has discretion to apply grounds not raised in the Minister’s application or to select which ground(s) to apply from among those raised. The issue usually arises in the context where the protected person argues that the RPD should allow the application only under paragraph 108(1)(e) due to a change of circumstances, rather than the other paragraphs of subsection 108(1). This argument is made because a person will lose their permanent resident status where their refugee protection is found to have ceased under paragraphs (a) to (d).

This issue has been considered in several decisions. In Al-ObeidiNote 83 the protected person was granted refugee status in 2002, fearing the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Following the fall of the Hussein regime, he travelled back to Iraq on six occasions. When he applied for citizenship, his travels became known to the Minister and they made an application to cease his refugee protection pursuant to paragraph 108(1)(a), arguing that he had reavailed himself of the protection of Iraq.

At the hearing, the RPD raised, on its own initiative, the possibility of deciding the application under paragraph 108(1)(e), since the country conditions in Iraq had changed. The Minister argued that the RPD must consider the grounds raised by the Minister in the application. The RPD declined to do so, and allowed the application to cease, but only under paragraph 108(1)(e).

Before the Court, the Minister argued the member had erred in adopting this approach. The Court disagreed. It held that IRPA gives the Board broad discretion in cessation matters. The fact that the Minister did not achieve the ultimate objective of the cessation application under paragraph 108(1)(a) does not justify a finding that the Board’s approach was unreasonable. The Court held that had Parliament wished to impose a duty on the Board to consider the specific ground raised in the Minister’s application, it clearly could have done so.

The Minister also argued that the RPD’s decision in Al-Obeidi was inconsistent with at least one previous RPD decision which had gone on to decide the cessation application under grounds other than paragraph 108(1)(e), despite a concession by the protected person that his status had ceased under paragraph (e). The court rejected this argument and stated:

[21] The Minister also contends that the Board’s decision in this case is inconsistent with the decision of another Board member (TB3-05609, 12 August 2014). There, the Board found that the respondent’s concession that her refugee status had ceased under s 108(1)(e) did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction to consider other potential grounds of cessation. Again, I do not see a contradiction. As mentioned, IRPA permits the Board to consider any grounds of cessation set out in s 108(1). A respondent’s concession that one ground has been satisfied would not prevent the Board from considering another. In the circumstances of that case, the Board felt obliged to consider other grounds of cessation that had been put forward by the Minister. The fact that the Board considered those other grounds does not suggest that the Board erred in not doing so in this case.
[22] In sum, on a cessation application by the Minister, the Board can consider any ground set out in s 108(1) of IRPA. If the respondent refugee persuades the Board, or concedes, that his or her status has ceased by virtue of a change of country conditions (s 108(1)(e)), the Board has discretion to consider other grounds. It is neither compelled to do so, nor prevented from doing so. However, where there is uncontradicted and undisputed evidence that the refugee’s status has ceased under another ground (e.g., acquisition of citizenship in a country capable of protection), the Board should consider it.

The Court in Tung,Note 84 cited Al-Obeidi with approval while dealing with a similar argument. However, in this case, the Minister and the protected person had provided joint submissions to the RPD that the application should have been allowed under paragraph 108(1)(e), but the RPD decided to allow the application under both paragraphs (a) and (e).

In that case, the protected person was granted refugee status in 2002 on the basis of her practise of Falun Gong and became a permanent resident in 2004. She applied for two Chinese passports and travelled to China twelve times between 2004 and 2014 for one month each time. She alleged that the reasons for which she claimed refugee status had ceased because she had stopped practising Falun Gong.

The RPD informed the parties before the hearing that it would be considering grounds not raised by the parties (i.e. paragraph 108(1)(a)). It found that the actions of applying for a Chinese passport, renewing the passport, voluntarily travelling to China twelve times for extended periods, and her interactions with Chinese authorities at the border and at her husband’s detention facility did not rebut the presumption that she intended to reavail herself of Chinese protection. With respect to the changed circumstances, the RPD agreed that it applied, but that it was unclear when the protected person stopped practising Falun Gong. As such, the RPD concluded that it could consider any of the cessation grounds.

The Court found that even though the protected person conceded that refugee status had ceased due to a change of circumstances, the RPD was within its discretion to consider other applicable grounds. The RPD did not err not following the joint recommendation. The discretion in IRPA cannot be fettered or controlled by the submission of parties. In addition, the RPD did not reject the joint submissions, but exercised its prerogative to consider other grounds and gave notice in advance of the hearing of its intent to do so. This was a reasonable approach. The Court stated:

[24] The Applicant argues that the RPD was required to make a definitive finding on when cessation occurred because, she contends, cessation can only occur once. However, this argument is not supported by the wording of section 108(1), which contemplates various circumstances that can give rise to cessation. In essence, what the Applicant is arguing is that the RPD cannot find more than one ground of cessation. For the reasons outlined below, this argument is without merit.
[28] Prior to the hearing, the RPD advised the parties that despite the conceded cessation ground, it would consider any other applicable cessation grounds. This approach is in keeping with the broad discretion the RPD has under the IRPA as noted by Justice O’Reilly in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Al-Obeidi, 2015 FC 1041 at paragraphs 21 and 22 as follows:
[29] Similarly, although the Applicant conceded cessation of refugee status under the singular ground of changed circumstances, the RPD was within its discretion to consider other applicable grounds of cessation. The fact that the RPD also considered the ground of re-availment does not suggest that the RPD failed to consider the change of circumstances.
[30] As noted, the Applicant does not take issue with the RPD finding of cessation on the basis of changed circumstances. Presumably, the Applicant assumed that by conceding this ground and having the agreement of the Minister, the RPD would restrict its consideration to the conceded ground. However, that is not how the RPD approached its assessment, nor was it compelled to do so. The Applicant further argues that the RPD erred by not providing its reasons for not following the joint submission of counsel.
[31] In my view, the argument that the RPD did not follow counsels joint submission is without merit and fails to acknowledge the discretion afforded to the RPD under the IRPA. It cannot be presumed that the drafters of the IRPA intended to allow the delegated discretion to be fettered or controlled by the submissions of parties or their legal counsel. I agree with the comment of Justice Zinn in Fong v Canada (Sécurité publique et Protection civile), 2010 CF 1134 [Fong] where he states at paragraph 31, “… the IAD is entitled to reject a joint submission so long as it provides reasons for so doing [citations omitted].” While the facts in Fong are different the principle applies.
[32] However here the RPD did not reject the joint submissions, but instead exercised its prerogative to consider other grounds of cessation under section 108(1) of the IRPA. Further, the RPD advised the parties in advance of the hearing that it would consider additional grounds of cessation and by doing so the RPD provided the necessary reasons for going beyond recommendations of legal counsel.
[33] Overall, the RPD’s assessment of cessation was reasonable and the RPD did not err in its approach to considering cessation under section 108(1).

In a similar case, Lu,Note 85 the protected person argued that, due to the fact she had renounced the practice of Falun Gong, her refugee protection had ceased before she obtained her passport and returned to China. She argued that a person ceases to be a refugee at a specific point in time, and once a person loses refugee status for one reason (e.g. changed circumstances in the country of origin), they cannot subsequently lose it again for another reason. Therefore, the RPD must determine both the reason for the loss and the moment in time when refugee status ceased. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the timing of events is only one factor to consider; however, the RPD must act reasonably and support its application of discretion with adequate reasons:

[37] The Applicant acknowledges that the RPD has discretion to consider an application for cessation of refugee status on any of the grounds set forth in subsection 108(1) of the IRPA but, in fact, her point in time argument would effectively negate that discretion. The premise that the RPD’s discretion is limited to a temporal determination of when refugee status was first lost and then an automatic application of one of the paragraphs in subsection 108(1) is not reflected in the statute or the jurisprudence of this Court. The argument unduly restricts the RPD’s discretion in a manner that was not contemplated by Parliament. The determination of loss of refugee status is made by the RPD on all of the facts and evidence in a particular case, and the timing of the events in question is only one aspect of the determination.

[38] In exercising its discretion and considering the grounds for cessation set out in subsection 108(1), the Applicant argues, and I agree, that the RPD must act reasonably and must support the exercise of its discretion with adequate reasons. Where more than one of the paragraphs of the subsection may apply, the RPD should assess the evidence and submissions of the parties in respect of each of the paragraphs in question. In Al-Obeidi, Justice O’Reilly stated that the RPD should consider the various grounds of cessation if, in the particular case, “there is uncontradicted and undisputed evidence that the refugee’s status has ceased under another ground” (Al-Obeidi at para 22).

[48] Finally, the Applicant argues that, where an application for cessation is made and the evidence discloses that cessation occurred due to a change in country conditions, the RPD should only render a finding based on paragraph 108(1)(e) of the IRPA as, otherwise, Parliament’s removal of the paragraph from the application of paragraph 46(1)(c.1) is rendered nugatory. I do not agree as, in the exercise of its discretion pursuant to subsections 108(1) and 108(2), the RPD is required to act reasonably. There will inevitably be cases before the tribunal in which the sequence of events and evidence demonstrate that the most reasonable application of paragraphs 108(1)(a) to (e) results in a finding of cessation due to a change in circumstances (paragraph 108(1)(e)).

The Federal Court decision in Khalifa,Note 86 was issued approximately one month after Al-Obeidi, but did not cite that decision. The RPD found the protected person’s refugee protection had ceased pursuant to paragraph 108(1)(c) [acquisition of a new nationality – United States] despite also finding that it had ceased pursuant to paragraph (e) [change of circumstances]. The protected person argued before the RPD that the application should only be allowed pursuant to paragraph 108(1)(e). He argued that the RPD exceeded its jurisdiction by determining that his status had ceased under paragraph (c) once the Board had already determined his protection had ceased pursuant to paragraph (e). The reasoning of this argument was that (i) it was contrary to the intention of Parliament when they created an exemption to the loss of permanent residence for a change in circumstances and (ii) it would lead to absurd results.

The Court disagreed. It found that the protected person’s interpretation contradicted the mandatory language of subsection 108(1). Also, it is reasonable that Parliament would terminate the privileged status of an applicant who no longer needs the protection of Canada because he has obtained citizenship in another safe country. This determination is entirely independent of a determination that the reasons for refugee protection no longer exist in the applicant’s country of origin. The Court concluded as follows on this issue:

[48] I disagree. This interpretation contradicts the clear mandatory language of the section that “a claim for refugee protection shall be rejected​ … in any of the following circumstances” [paragraphs (a) to (e)]. Mr. Khalifa offers no jurisprudence or citations from texts on interpretive principles to support his argument limiting the discretion of the Minister under section 108.
[49] It is also reasonable that Parliament would terminate the privileged status of an applicant who no longer needs the protection of Canada because he has obtained citizenship in another safe country prior to becoming a citizen of Canada. Mr. Khalifa is now, by choice, a U.S. citizen who enjoys the protection of another country, and thus no longer needs protection from Canada. It is not the intention of refugee protection legislation under the IRPA that Canada become a country of convenience for those who wish to acquire protection in any number of countries. This determination is entirely independent of a determination that the reasons for refugee protection no longer exist in his country of origin.

In Ravandi,Note 87 the Court stated in obiter that Al-Obeidi strongly suggests that it is not reasonable for the RPD to stop its analysis with a finding that refugee protection had ceased under paragraph 108(1)(e) when there is uncontradicted and uncontested evidence of reavailment.

The issue was also briefly dealt with by the Court of Appeal in Siddiqui,Note 88 where the protected person argued that the RPD erred by not considering whether it could have made its decision under paragraph 108(1)(e). The Court noted that the issue was not raised before the RPD, and declined to consider the argument, only stating that “no error arises in the decision of the RPD not to entertain a ground of cessation which was neither advanced by the Minister or the appellant.”

12.6.2. Relevance of future risk

When examining cessation under paragraph 108(1)(e), a change in circumstances is examined to determine if there is a current risk of return to the protected person. However, is the risk of return relevant when assessing cessation under paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection 108(1)? The Court has found that the answer to this question is “no”.

In Balouch,Note 89 the protected person, a citizen of Iran, was granted refugee status in 2008 on the basis of risk due to her religion, being a Christian. She applied for an Iranian passport in 2010 and travelled to Iran that year to visit her grandmother. She stayed six months. In 2013, she returned to Iran for 34 days. During both visits, she received medical care. The RPD granted the Minister’s application to cease, finding that she had reavailed herself of the protection of Iran within the meaning of paragraph 108(1)(a) of the IRPA. The Court rejected the argument that the RPD should have examined the issue of continuing risk at the time of the cessation hearing. It stated:

[19] Although the Applicant submits that the Board erred in not considering the issue of a continuing risk at the time of the cessation hearing, no authority was cited to support this argument. While I acknowledge that the existence of risk is a primary concern when protection is sought, I am not persuaded that the issue of risk is relevant in a cessation hearing.
[20] Pursuant to section 96 of the Act, Convention refugee status is conferred on individuals who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution, are unwilling or unable to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality. A refugee claimant’s voluntary reavailment indicates that the individual is no longer either unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of their country of nationality.
[21] In any event, the issue of risk will be assessed if the Applicant seeks a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (“PRRA”) pursuant to section 112 of the Act. The fact that a PRRA is subject to certain temporal limits does not mean that a PRRA is unavailable.

The Court in Yuan,Note 90 came to a similar conclusion. It explained that the rationale for this is that once the conditions are present and paragraphs (a) to (d) apply, the element of subjective fear no longer exists such that it is appropriate that refugee protection should then expire. Any concerns about refoulement due to future risk can be addressed by other processes, such as seeking deferral of removal or an application for a PRRA.

12.6.3. Relevance of humanitarian and compassionate considerations

In Abadi,Note 91 the protected person argued that the RPD should have considered humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) factors such as his degree of establishment in Canada and the best interests of his Canadian-born children. The Court held that “I cannot fault the RPD for declining to consider H&C factors in this case. In my opinion, these factors are properly the subject of a separate application under s. 25 of the IRPA.”Note 92

In Seid,Note 93 the RPD ruled in 2018 that it was not bound by an Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) decision from 2011 in which the IAD had allowed the respondent’s residency obligation appeal. The IAD had found that there were compelling reasons for the respondent to have returned to Chad. The Court agreed with the RPD. The analytical framework used by the IAD was different than that imposed on the RPD in the context of cessation. The RPD had no jurisdiction to consider H&C factors.

The Federal Court of Appeal has also confirmed that humanitarian and compassionate considerations are not relevant in cessation proceedings in the context of an officer’s decision to make an application. In Bermudez,Note 94 the Court of Appeal was examining the question of whether a CIC hearings officer, in deciding whether an application should be filed with the RPD, has the discretion to consider circumstances or factors that are not explicitly listed in section 108 such as H&C factors and the best interests of the child. The Federal Court had granted the judicial review, finding that the hearings officer had some discretion to consider H&C factors and to not make a cessation application for these reasons.

The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the officer had no discretion to consider H&C factors. The Court held that H&C is considered principally under section 25 of the IRPA, and there is a limited class of individuals to which the Minister has delegated authority to consider H&C applications. Further, Parliament's intent, as reflected in section 108 of the IRPA, is clear and unambiguous in that a claim for refugee protection shall be rejected if one or more of the circumstances in section 108 occur. There is little room for discretion in terms of the circumstances that trigger the application of section 108.Note 95

12.6.4. Abuse of process and similar arguments

In Khalifa,Note 96 the respondent before the RPD argued that the cessation application was an abuse of process because the Minister had exceeded his powers by suspending his citizenship application pending the outcome of the cessation application. The RPD declined to consider if the suspension of the citizenship application was an abuse of process. The Court agreed with the RPD. It found that the appropriate venue to challenge the Minister’s suspension of the respondent’s citizenship application was through an application in the nature of mandamus.Note 97 Therefore, the RPD did not err in refusing to determine whether the Minister engaged in an abuse of process by suspending Mr. Khalifa’s citizenship application.Note 98

Several arguments were raised in Li,Note 99 concerning the legality of the proceedings. First, the protected person argued that since a visa officer overseas had issued him a travel document and permanent resident card to return to Canada, the issue of cessation had already been decided (res judicata). Alternatively, he argued that the Minister had waived the opportunity to bring the cessation application. The Court rejected these arguments, finding the issue of cessation had not been decided nor had the Minister waived the opportunity to make a cessation application. While there were common factual issues between the decision to issue a permanent resident card and the question of cessation, the two issues were legally distinct.

Another argument in Li, was that the cessation application constituted an abuse of process due to delay and the fact the cessation provisions were being applied retroactively in an effort to remove the claimant because of his criminality. The Court rejected these arguments. There was no evidence of prejudice due to the delay. The provisions were not being applied retroactively and there was nothing improper about the Minister pursuing admissibility proceedings and cessation proceedings concurrently.

A different abuse of process argument was raised in Abadi.Note 100 It concerned the fact that the claimant’s original refugee claim file had been destroyed according to the applicable retention and disposal authority. In light of this, the protected person argued that the cessation application was an abuse of process because of the uncertainty around why he was granted refugee status almost 20 years earlier, which would result in difficulty assessing whether country conditions had changed or if he took reasonable precautions when he returned to Iran. The Court rejected this argument since there was no serious dispute that he obtained refugee status as a child based on his mother’s gender-based persecution. The Court held that the protected person failed to demonstrate that the disposal of the original refugee determination file compromised his ability to respond to the application, or that it was one of the clearest of cases justifying a stay of proceedings.

In Seid,Note 101 the protected person argued that the application to cease constituted an abuse of process because the Minister knew since 2009 that he had returned to Chad, but only made the application to cease in 2016. The Court rejected this argument. It held that in assessing whether there was an abuse of process, the RPD could only consider the delay related to the administrative procedures before the RPD. The delay of approximately two years between the filing of the application with the RPD and the RPD’s decision did not constitute an abuse of process.

Finally in Maqbool,Note 102 the RPD rejected an abuse of process argument even though it found the protected person had been questioned beyond the scope allowed by legislation at the port of entry and that he should have been informed of his right to counsel. The RPD found that although the interviews were problematic, they did not amount to an abuse of process and the situation was remedied by excluding the interview notes from evidence. The Court noted this issue but did not comment on it; however, it did uphold the RPD decision.

12.6.5. Constitutionality of cessation provisions

The constitutionality of the cessation regime, and in particular the automatic loss of permanent resident status set out in paragraph 46(1)(c.1) of the IRPA, has been the subject of litigation. The constitutional validity of this section was first raised in Yuan,Note 103 however, the Court declined to entertain the constitutional arguments as they had not been first raised before the RPD. The Court stated that even though the RPD may not have jurisdiction to decide this issue, and in fact had declined jurisdiction in other decisions, this did not relieve the party contesting the validity of the section from raising it before the RPD.

In Norouzi,Note 104 the Federal Court did address the question of whether the cumulative effect of the cessation provisions breached sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter. The questions had been raised before the RPD, but the RPD held that it did not have jurisdiction to decide this constitutional question. The Court did not comment on the jurisdictional question, but did examine the merits of the constitutional arguments.

With respect to the application of section 7 of the Charter (the right to life, liberty, and security of the person) and section 12 (the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment), the Court found that both of these arguments were premature and that neither section was engaged. At the cessation stage, even though the consequence was loss of permanent resident status and inadmissibility, no removal order would be issued until an officer prepared a section 44 report and it was determined to be well-founded. In addition, there were other avenues open to the person, including seeking a deferral of removal.

With respect to section 15 (equality before the law; equal protection and equal benefit of the law), the Court held that the cessation provisions did not create a distinction based on one of the enumerated characteristics, or an analogous characteristic. Since this was a requirement to find a breach of this section, the constitutional arguments failed.

Notes

Note 1

S.C. 2001, c. 27.

Return to the reference note 1

Note 2

United Nations Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, January 1992, reissued December, 2011 at paragraph 111.

Return to the reference note 2

Note 3

S.C. 2012, c. 17.

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Note 4

Le The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations were amended in 2014 to add paragraph 228(1)(b.1) giving the Minister the authority to issue a removal order. The appropriate removal order is a departure order.

Return to the reference note 4

Note 5

Ravandi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 761, paras 45-47.

Return to the reference note 5

Note 6

Conferral of refugee protection

95 (1) Refugee protection is conferred on a person when

(a) the person has been determined to be a Convention refugee or a person in similar circumstances under a visa application and becomes a permanent resident under the visa or a temporary resident under a temporary resident permit for protection reasons;

(b) the Board determines the person to be a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection; or

(c) except in the case of a person described in subsection 112(3), the Minister allows an application for protection.

Asile

95 (1) L’asile est la protection conférée à toute personne dès lors que, selon le cas :

a) sur constat qu’elle est, à la suite d’une demande de visa, un réfugié au sens de la Convention ou une personne en situation semblable, elle devient soit un résident permanent au titre du visa, soit un résident temporaire au titre d’un permis de séjour délivré en vue de sa protection;

b) la Commission lui reconnaît la qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention ou celle de personne à protéger;

c) le ministre accorde la demande de protection, sauf si la personne est visée au paragraphe 112(3).

Return to the reference note 6

Note 7

SOR/2002-227.

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Note 8

Sections 144-145 of the regulations. This class relates to those who have been determined to be Convention refugees outside Canada.

Return to the reference note 8

Note 9

Sections 146-151 of the regulations. This class relates to persons in need of resettlement because they are outside their country(ies) of nationality or former habitual residence and have been, and continue to be, seriously and personally affected by civil war, armed conflict or massive violation of human rights in each of those countries.

Return to the reference note 9

Note 10

Section 151.1 of the regulations. This class relates to persons who hold a temporary resident permit under certain circumstances.

Return to the reference note 10

Note 11

Siddiqui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 134.

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Note 12

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Esfand, 2015 FC 1190. (Appeal filed by the Minister but a Notice of Discontinuance was filed on June 1, 2016; F.C.A. no. A-495-15).

Return to the reference note 12

Note 13

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Gezik,2015 FC 1268. (Appeal filed by the Minister but a Notice of Discontinuance was filed on May 5, 2016; F.C.A. no. A-532-15).

Return to the reference note 13

Note 14

Camayo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 213, paras 17-28.

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Note 15

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Camayo (FCA no. A-79-20). The certified question is: Where a person is recognized as a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection by reason of being listed as a dependent on an inland refugee claim heard before the Refugee Protection Division [RPD], but where the RPD’s decision to confer protection does not confirm that an individual or personalized risk assessment of the dependent was performed, is that person a Convention refugee as contemplated in paragraph 95(1) of the IRPA and therefore subject to cessation of refugee status pursuant to subsection 108(2) of the IRPA?

Return to the reference note 15

Note 16

The Minister’s legal title is the “Minister of Citizenship and Immigration”, while the applied title in accordance with Treasury Board policy is the “Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship.”

Return to the reference note 16

Note 17

However, authority to make an application to cease under subsection 108(2) of the IRPA has been delegated by the Minister of CIC to Canada Border Services Agency Hearings Officers as per Department of Citizenship and Immigration Instrument of Designation and Delegation (May 1, 2018). While exercising that authority, the officers would be representing the Minister of CIC and not the Minister of Public Safety in the cessation proceedings.

Return to the reference note 17

Note 18

SOR/2012-256.

Return to the reference note 18

Note 19

See, for example, Seid v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1167 , para 16 (protected person served in Chad); Starovic v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 827,  paras 6-7 (protected person remained in Serbia and participated in the hearing by telephone).

Return to the reference note 19

Note 20

See, for example, RPD File no. MB3-04124: X (Re), 2014 CanLII 99249 (November 13, 2014); RPD File no. VB4-00790: X (Re), 2015 CanLII 102735 (December 3, 2015).

Return to the reference note 20

Note 21

Perez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1171.

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Note 22

See, for example, Youssef v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C. no. IMM-990-98), para 22; Li v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 459, para 42.

Return to the reference note 22

Note 23

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Barrios, 2020 FC 29.

Return to the reference note 23

Note 24

United Nations Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, January 1992, reissued December 2011.

Return to the reference note 24

Note 25

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Bashir, 2015 FC 51, paras 44-47.

Return to the reference note 25

Note 26

Ibid., paras 67-68.

Return to the reference note 26

Note 27

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Gezik, 2015 FC 1268.

Return to the reference note 27

Note 28

Paragraph 118 of the UNHCR Handbook draws a distinction between reavailment and re-establishment, the former applying when the refugee is still outside his or her country of nationality and the latter applying when the refugee has returned to his or her country of nationality. Such a clear distinction does not seem to have been adopted in Canadian jurisprudence.

The argument was raised in Seid v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1167, paras 16-18 that pursuant to paragraph 118 of the Handbook, reavailment could not apply to the protected person because the application to cease was served on him in Chad, his country of nationality. The Court rejected this argument because he was not actually living in Chad; therefore, the substantive merit of the argument was not analyzed by the Court.

Return to the reference note 28

Note 29

Kuoch v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 979, para 25.

Return to the reference note 29

Note 30

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Bashir, 2015 FC 51. Also see Cadena Cabrera v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 67,  para 25.

Return to the reference note 30

Note 31

Lu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1060. In this case, the protected person argued that reavailment occurs when a refugee actually receives a passport and not at the time of making the application because it is only on receipt of the passport that protection of the country of origin is obtained. The Court held that the argument attempts to limit the RPD’s reavailment analysis to a single event and is unduly restrictive. This was cited with approval in Chokheli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 800, para 37.

Return to the reference note 31

Note 32

El Kaissi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1234, para 29.

Return to the reference note 32

Note 33

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Bashir, 2015 FC 51, para 50.

Return to the reference note 33

Note 34

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Bashir, 2015 FC 51, para 57.

Return to the reference note 34

Note 35

Mayell v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 139.

Return to the reference note 35

Note 36

Abechkhrishvili v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 313.

Return to the reference note 36

Note 37

Starovic v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 827.

Return to the reference note 37

Note 38

Camayo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 213, para 37 (Appeal pending, FCA no. A-79-20).

Return to the reference note 38

Note 39

Cadena Cabrera v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 67.

Return to the reference note 39

Note 40

Andrade v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 1007, paras 9-15.

Return to the reference note 40

Note 41

Camayo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 213, para 37 (Appeal pending, FCA no. A-79-20).

Return to the reference note 41

Note 42

Li v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 459, paras 37-43.

Return to the reference note 42

Note 43

Cadena Cabrera v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 67.

Return to the reference note 43

Note 44

Maqbool v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1146.

Return to the reference note 44

Note 45

Ibid., paras 23-30.

Return to the reference note 45

Note 46

Abadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 29, paras 16 and 18. Abadi was cited for this principle in Norouzi v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2017 FC 368 . A question was certified by the Federal Court and an appeal was filed with the Federal Court of Appeal, but a Notice of Discontinuance was filed on June 27, 2017 (F.C.A. no. A-159-17). Also see Seid v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1167, para 20 and Lu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1060, para 60.

Return to the reference note 46

Note 47

Ibid., para 19.

Return to the reference note 47

Note 48

Li v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 459.

Return to the reference note 48

Note 49

Norouzi v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2017 FC 368.

Return to the reference note 49

Note 50

Tung v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1224.

Return to the reference note 50

Note 51

Jing v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 104.

Return to the reference note 51

Note 52

Sabuncu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 62.

Return to the reference note 52

Note 53

Abechkhrishvili v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 313.

Return to the reference note 53

Note 54

Ibid., para 23.

Return to the reference note 54

Note 55

Okojie v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1287, paras 25–33 followed in Chokheli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 800, paras 32-35 and paras 67-71. Also see Peiqrishvili v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1205 where the Court stated at para 17 “While I am not convinced that the nature of the agent of persecution mandates a qualitatively different analysis, I accept that an individualized analysis was required and that the source of the persecution is relevant to that analysis.” However, see Thapachetri v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 600 where the Court quashed the RPD decision because the RPD did not consider the protected person’s argument that the agent of persecution was a non-state actor.

Return to the reference note 55

Note 56

Chokheli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 800.

Return to the reference note 56

Note 57

Al-Habib v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 545.

Return to the reference note 57

Note 58

Camayo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 213 (Appeal pending, FCA no. A-79-20).

Return to the reference note 58

Note 59

Ibid., para 46.

Return to the reference note 59

Note 60

Ibid. The three certified questions are:

  1. Where a person is recognized as a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection by reason of being listed as a dependent on an inland refugee claim heard before the Refugee Protection Division [RPD], but where the RPD’s decision to confer protection does not confirm that an individual or personalized risk assessment of the dependent was performed, is that person a Convention refugee as contemplated in paragraph 95(1) of the IRPA and therefore subject to cessation of refugee status pursuant to subsection 108(2) of the IRPA?
  2. If yes to Question 1, can evidence of the refugee’s lack of subjective [let alone any] knowledge that use of a passport confers diplomatic protection be relied on to rebut the presumption that a refugee who acquires and travels on a passport issued by their country of origin to travel to a third country has intended to avail themselves of that state’s protection?
  3. If yes to Question 1, can evidence that a refugee took measures to protect themselves against their agent of persecution [or that of their family member who is the principal refugee applicant] be relied on to rebut the presumption that a refugee who acquires [or renews] a passport issued by their country of origin and uses it to return to their country of origin has intended to avail themselves of that state’s protection?

Return to the reference note 60

Note 61

Cerna v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1074.

Return to the reference note 61

Note 62

Mayell v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 139. Similar arguments were rejected in Pereira v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1413. Even though the protected person received advice that she could travel to her country of citizenship, Singapore, without jeopardizing her refugee status or permanent residency (advice that was correct at the time it was given in 2010), she nevertheless continued to travel after the IRPA was amended in 2012 and after she was advised by a Canadian immigration official that she was risking her status by travelling to Singapore. Similarly, in Wesh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 304, the Court held that even if the protected person had been misled by her lawyer when applying for her first passport in 2007, it did not explain her 11 trips back to Haiti between 2009 and 2014. See also Ligorio v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1401 (link not available), where the Court quashed the RPD decision because the RPD did not discuss in detail what impact misunderstandings created by Government of Canada information sheets had on the protected person’s intention.

Return to the reference note 62

Note 63

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Bashir, 2015 FC 51. See also Nsende v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 531 where the RPD had granted the Minister’s application to cease. The protected person explained that he had obtained a Congolese passport with the intention of doing business in Thailand. The Federal Court quashed the decision, finding that the RPD did not explain why the protected person’s explanations were not sufficient.

Return to the reference note 63

Note 64

Din v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 425, paras 34-39. This decision was distinguished in Chokheli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 800, paras 48-54.

Return to the reference note 64

Note 65

Peiqrishvili v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1205, paras 18–25.

Return to the reference note 65

Note 66

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Antoine, 2020 FC 370.

Return to the reference note 66

Note 67

See, for example, Abadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 29 (travel through two countries with an Iranian passport); Maqbool v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1146 (travel through four countries with a Pakistani passport); and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Nilam, 2015 FC 1154 (travel to country of nationality and India).

Return to the reference note 67

Note 68

Yuan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 923..

Return to the reference note 68

Note 69

Jing v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 104. See also Abechkhrishvili v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 313, para 26 where the Court also distinguished Yuan because in Yuan the protected person was actively hiding while in Abechkhrishvili the protected person stayed at a family cottage where she could easily be located.

Return to the reference note 69

Note 70

Lu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1060, para 61.

Return to the reference note 70

Note 71

Maqbool v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1146.

Return to the reference note 71

Note 72

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Nilam, 2015 FC 1154, paras 30-36.

Return to the reference note 72

Note 73

Ibid., para 33.

Return to the reference note 73

Note 74

Din v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 425, paras 40-46.

Return to the reference note 74

Note 75

Starovic v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 827.

Return to the reference note 75

Note 76

Khalifa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1181.

Return to the reference note 76

Note 77

Starovic v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 827.

Return to the reference note 77

Note 78

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)v. Zaric, 2015 FC 837. Appeal filed August 12, 2015 but discontinued April 12, 2016 (Court file number F.C.A. A-355-15).

Return to the reference note 78

Note 79

See footnote 28 regarding the distinction between reavailment and re-establishment.

Return to the reference note 79

Note 80

Starovic v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 827.

Return to the reference note 80

Note 81

Ibid., para 7.

Return to the reference note 81

Note 82

Cadena Cabrera v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 67.

Return to the reference note 82

Note 83

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Al-Obeidi, 2015 FC 1041.

Return to the reference note 83

Note 84

Tung v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1224. In Okojie v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1287, paras 16-24, the Court, citing Tung, also dismissed an argument that the RPD erred by allowing the Minister’s application under paragraph 108(1)(a) instead of 108(1)(e). In that case, the Court held that even if the RPD erred in its interpretation of paragraph 108(1)(e), it is not determinative or fatal to the decision as the outcome would remain the same based on the paragraph 108(1)(a) analysis. The RPD has the discretion to base its cessation finding on any of the provisions of subsection 108(1) and is not restricted to the application of the provisions proposed by either the Minister or the protected person.

Return to the reference note 84

Note 85

Lu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1060 followed in Chokheli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 800, paras 36-37.

Return to the reference note 85

Note 86

Khalifa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1181.

Return to the reference note 86

Note 87

Ravandi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 761, paras 53-55.

Return to the reference note 87

Note 88

Siddiqui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 134, para 27.

Return to the reference note 88

Note 89

Balouch v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 765. A question was certified in this case, and an appeal was filed with the Federal Court of Appeal, but a Notice of Discontinuance was filed on February 2, 2016 (F.C.A. no. A-320-15). The Court in Abadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 29, para 20 cited Balouch in coming to the same conclusion regarding future risk. See also Seid v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1167, para 27.

Return to the reference note 89

Note 90

Yuan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 923, paras 17-25. Also see Jing v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 104, paras 32-34 and Wesh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 304, paras 22-24.

Return to the reference note 90

Note 91

Abadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 29.

Return to the reference note 91

Note 92

Ibid., para 24.

Return to the reference note 92

Note 93

Seid v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1167, paras 23 and 27.

Return to the reference note 93

Note 94

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)  v. Bermudez,2016 FCA 131.

Return to the reference note 94

Note 95

The Court answered the certified question as follows:

Question: Does the CBSA Hearings Officer, or the Hearings Officer as the Minister’s delegate, have the discretion to consider H&C factors and the best interests of a child, when deciding whether to make a cessation application pursuant to subsection 108(2) in respect of a permanent resident?

Answer: No.

Return to the reference note 95

Note 96

Khalifa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1181.

Return to the reference note 96

Note 97

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Nilam, 2017 FCA 44, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied: Nilam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (SCC docket number 37556), August 10, 2017.

Return to the reference note 97

Note 98

There is considerable jurisprudence on the authority of the Minister to suspend citizenship proceedings pending a cessation application. This topic is outside the scope of this chapter; however, in Nilam, the Federal Court of Appeal dealt the following certified question and answered it thusly:

Question: Can the Minister suspend the processing of an application for citizenship pursuant to his authority under s. 13.1 of the Citizenship Act, to await the results of cessation proceedings in respect of the applicant under s. 108(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act?

Answer: Yes.

Return to the reference note 98

Note 99

Li v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 459.

Return to the reference note 99

Note 100

Abadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 29.

Return to the reference note 100

Note 101

Seid v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1167, paras 28-32.

Return to the reference note 101

Note 102

Maqbool v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1146, paras 11-13.

Return to the reference note 102

Note 103

Yuan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 923.Also see Peiqrishvili v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1205, paras 26-27 where the Court, in obiter, questioned whether the RPD had jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of paragraph 46(1)(c.1).

Return to the reference note 103

Note 104

Norouzi v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2017 FC 368.

Return to the reference note 104

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